[!WARNING] Final verdict available at the end of this report.
This JAR scan inspected iris-1.7.6_mc1.20.1.jar, a 2.73 MB Java archive containing 987 classes and 5,994 methods. All 987 classes were parsed successfully, and the decompiler attempted and completed analysis for all of them. The scanner marked 28 classes (2.84% of the archive) for review, mainly because they access files, enumerate shader-pack folders, import packs, or write configuration and diagnostic output.
The scan also found hardcoded links to github.com and irisshaders.dev. These links appear to be the Iris project page, issue tracker, and website. One class had a minor decompiler anomaly while reading a rendering-pipeline method, but the rest of the class and archive remained analyzable.
Scanner flags need context: file access is expected in a shader mod that loads ZIP shader packs, reads shader files, saves settings, and can export textures. The class-level evidence below helps distinguish those normal features from genuinely harmful behavior.
No high-signal malicious behavior was detected.
The report does not show evidence of credential theft, token grabbing, browser-data collection, hidden payload downloads, operating-system command execution, startup persistence, destructive file deletion, ransomware-like behavior, or unexplained data exfiltration.
The detected file operations are concentrated in Iris’s shader-pack, configuration, texture-export, and file-selection features. The detected URLs are project-related links to GitHub and the Iris website, rather than suspicious download servers or unknown IP addresses.
The evidence is not consistent with a remote-access trojan (RAT).
There are no reported indicators of remote command control, command execution, persistence, hidden background control channels, credential collection, or covert outbound connections. The only network-related findings are hardcoded HTTPS URLs for the Iris project, issue tracker, and website.
The scanner’s “suspicious” label mostly reflects broad rules for file access and reflection. In this JAR, the flagged classes are part of the net.irisshaders.iris package and their names match expected shader-mod functions.
| Class | Severity | Behavior | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
net.irisshaders.iris.Iris |
Low / review | Loads external shader packs, reads and updates configuration, locates the shader-pack directory | Java NIO file access, folder enumeration, and class-loader API use in shader-pack validation/loading methods |
net.irisshaders.iris.config.IrisConfig |
Low | Loads and saves Iris configuration | File access in initialize, load, and save |
net.irisshaders.iris.gui.FileDialogUtil |
Low | Lets the user choose files through a file dialog | File-selection method using Java file APIs |
net.irisshaders.iris.gui.screen.ShaderPackScreen |
Low | Imports shader-pack options and handles dropped shader-pack files | File access in pack import and file-drop handlers |
net.irisshaders.iris.shaderpack.* |
Low | Reads shader-pack files, properties, includes, textures, and program sources | Extensive file access consistent with loading local shader packs |
net.irisshaders.iris.shaderpack.discovery.ShaderpackDirectoryManager |
Low | Lists and copies shader packs into the shader-pack folder | File access and directory enumeration |
net.irisshaders.iris.texture.* |
Low | Exports or dumps textures for diagnostics/debugging | File-writing APIs in texture export/dump methods |
net.irisshaders.iris.compat.dh.DHCompat |
Low / review | Compatibility support for another mod or rendering environment | Reflection API use; no network, command, or credential-related evidence |
net.irisshaders.iris.LaunchWarn |
Low | Contains a link to the Iris website | Literal URL: https://irisshaders.dev |
net.irisshaders.iris.pipeline.transform.transformer.CompatibilityTransformer |
Low | References an Iris GitHub issue for compatibility context | Literal URL: GitHub issue 509 |
One class-loader-related flag appears in Iris’s shader-pack loading and validation logic. Loading shader packs from folders or ZIP files can legitimately require special handling of resources and classes. The report does not show that this feature downloads or executes external code.
No suspicious bundled third-party library classes were identified in this report.
The scanned classes flagged for review are predominantly Iris’s own net.irisshaders.iris code. The report does not identify common telemetry, database, HTTP-client, or process-launching libraries as the source of the alerts.
The scanner found hardcoded HTTPS URLs, but a hardcoded URL alone does not prove that the mod automatically connects to it.
Detected hosts and URLs:
github.comhttps://github.com/IrisShaders/Irishttps://github.com/IrisShaders/Iris.githttps://github.com/IrisShaders/Iris/issueshttps://github.com/IrisShaders/Iris/issues/509irisshaders.devhttps://irisshaders.devThe GitHub links are stored in fabric.mod.json and Iris classes, and appear to identify the project repository and issue tracker. No unknown domains, raw IP addresses, credential endpoints, file-hosting links, or suspicious download URLs were reported.
Analysis coverage was strong:
The one anomaly was in net.irisshaders.iris.Iris, in the method createPipeline(NamespacedId dimensionId). The decompiler reported a stack-underflow fallback while interpreting one instruction. This is a minor analysis issue, not proof of obfuscation or malware—especially because the scanner still analyzed every class and reported no decompilation failures.
The report also notes reflection and class-loader APIs. These can make code harder to inspect automatically, but here they appear in compatibility and shader-pack handling areas rather than alongside malware-like behavior.
This appears to be the Iris shader mod for a Fabric-based Minecraft installation, based on the fabric.mod.json file and the net.irisshaders.iris package name.
Its flagged behavior fits a shader mod’s normal job:
The report does not show behavior normally associated with a malicious Minecraft mod, such as stealing Minecraft session tokens, Discord tokens, launcher credentials, browser data, or installing a persistent remote-control component.
IrisConfig loads and saves the mod’s settings.DHCompat likely uses reflection to work with optional external compatibility targets without requiring them to always be installed.No major red flags were found in this report.
The only unresolved item is a single minor decompiler fallback in a rendering-related method. Static analysis could not fully reconstruct that one method’s instruction flow, but this happened in only 1 out of 987 classes and was not accompanied by suspicious network, process, credential, or persistence behavior.
9eb15e563e0c9ae6eff15b7863f8432dd290cf9f724c7373e9b15b14aa829ed5.Static JAR scanning reduces risk by inspecting code, strings, APIs, and archive contents, but it cannot prove a file is completely safe. It may not fully reveal behavior that only occurs with a specific game setup, external shader pack, server, environment, or future remote service change.
A clean-looking scan also does not confirm that the file was obtained from the official publisher. Source verification and hash comparison remain important.
Yes. A Java JAR can contain malicious code, including credential stealers, hidden downloaders, remote-control tools, or destructive actions. This scan found no high-signal evidence of those behaviors in this JAR.
Check where it was downloaded from, compare its hash with an official release if available, scan its contents, and look for suspicious behavior such as credential access, unknown network connections, command execution, persistence, or hidden downloads. For this file, the scan found mostly shader-pack and configuration-related file access.
It can flag common RAT-related signs such as remote-control behavior, suspicious connections, command execution, credential theft, persistence, and hidden payload loading. This report does not contain those indicators.
No. Obfuscation or decompiler problems can occur in legitimate Java software because of compiler behavior, transformations, compatibility code, or complex bytecode. This report found one minor decompiler anomaly, not widespread obfuscation or anti-analysis behavior.
Verdict: Trust
Risk level: Low
Confidence: High
Should I trust this JAR, and why? Based on this scan, this JAR looks consistent with a legitimate Iris Minecraft shader mod. Nearly all flagged behavior is expected for loading local shader packs, managing configuration, importing files, and exporting rendering diagnostics. The only network-related findings are links to the official Iris website and GitHub project pages, with no evidence of hidden downloads or unknown outbound destinations. The scan found no signs of credential theft, RAT behavior, destructive actions, process execution, persistence, or data exfiltration. Still, trust the file most when it was downloaded from an official Iris source and its hash matches the published release.